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Abstract.  The ideas have a fundamental importance for world’s 
destiny. Within the human civilization world of thinking, the scientific ideas 
represent the essence of logical structure of human mind and the truths 
about the human action and society that can be discovered by man. In this 
approach, I will argue why the scholar honest-mindedness must be his 
principle in life. In world’s vision about post-modernity, the only faith today 
is that everything is relative or otherwise stated that there is no ultimate 
criterion for making absolute hierarchies in order to distinguish truth from 
false. Thus has gradually appeared the less desired idea that ethical 
standards represent simple social conventions, fact that would impede the 
possibility of ethically validating a multitude of “alternative institutional 
arrangements”, including the ones contradictory with human nature and 
individual freedom. This study represents a plea for the virtues of logic and 
faith in truth and justice. Moreover, the original signification of the word 
“science” – scientia – is correct knowledge. Bearing this clarification in 
mind, the researchers would maybe become more responsible in calling any 
approach as being a “scientific” one and implicitly they would become more 
exigent with their own creations. 
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Acquiring correct knowledge is not an axiomatic exercise in itself, aimed at 
building those judgements, ideas, theories that have the capacity to challenge time 
and space; to do science implies in the same time to discover and to eliminate all 
the errors that the human mind is able to identify and eliminate, fact that shows the 
necessity of combating the erroneous ideas whose imposition and popularisation 
generates poverty and conflict, as history shows. The example of failed “social 
engineering”, such as socialism or economic nationalism, proves that in science 
things unfortunately happen as they do in life: not always scientists that deserve to 
be renowned are renowned and not always those that have a good reputation 
deserve it. I thus express my fear that the relativist world of the 20
th century, such 
that it was characterised by the famous historicist Paul Johnson, finds itself in the 
academic field under a relativism of knowledge, fact that easily undermined the 
credibility of the scientific intellectual exercise. 
In contrast with the correct knowledge, it can be actually remarked a certain 
type of anti-intellectualism that parasites not only the evolution of science, but also 
the culture – at the most general and sensible level of addressability. This worrying 
evolution can be translated through the abandonment of individual conscience in 
the “collective” state identity, through the erosion of the individual autonomy spirit, 
through the disaggregation of the individual by today’s mass minorities (ethnic, 
political, cultural, sexual, etc.) The phrase “think with your own mind” had 
probably become out of fashion and in equal manner useless since the life and the 
human problems end up in ready-mixed models in the social hierarchy. The 
scientific world itself has gradually become captive of a sort of “scientism” whose 
nature finally proves to be “anti-scientific”
(1). Should it be all about a scientist 
assault over logic, over rational judgement? Or should it be about optimizing good 
by underlining bad? 
In world’s vision about post-modernity, the only faith is that no essential 
reality exists; that everything is relative or otherwise stated that there is no ultimate 
criterion for making hierarchies in order to distinguish truth from false. The 
question of concern is whether this intellectual relativism perverts  the full 
affirmation of the human personality and of fair social institutions or disqualifies 
the scientific act through popularising in an interesting manner a faith that is 
obviously misleading, regarded through the eye of correct scientific knowledge. 
The confusion between the relativity theory and making the theory 
relative, as a method, has contributed to making both truth and justice relative – 
however these philosophical categories cannot ontologically exist separately. 
The word of order has become tolerance above the necessary human spirit: we 
gradually learned to tolerate ignorance, superficiality, lack of morality, even 
fraud – if it is legal and derives from the discretionary “democratic” 
governmental power. The inevitable consequence lies in the multitude of 
dilemmas that actually suffocate the moral and cultural values: cloning, Economic Science and Postmodernism: Ethics Return 
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abortions, ecological problems, euthanasia, freedom of opinion, arms 
possession, prostitution and homosexuality, immigration, social security, 
sustainable development, war and terrorism, etc. The example of war is the 
illustration of the fact that many things of which people knew and learned that 
were bad are sometimes considered to be appropriate. The reciprocal is 
unfortunately valid as well regarding some ethical values that have ensured for 
centuries the very basis of the human civilisation. In this manner arises the 
impossibility of stating a principle argument for or against ideas and 
phenomena, irrespective of how incorrect and lacked of logic they may be
(2). 
These confusions mostly bear the mark of multiculturalism and 
postmodernism as central academic movements of the contemporary society. 
Steven Yates shows that the major anxiety of postmodernism has its source in 
the incertitude regarding the virtues of truth, fact that explains both the lack of 
interest and the refusal to accept its existence. Under these circumstances it is 
easily understood why the academic discourse became captured of arbitrary, 
circumstantial arguments whose essence lies in interpreting whatever inequality 
as injustice and reducing the superior to inferior in all spheres of diversity. In 
the context of this harmonization tendency towards inferiority and 
egalitarianism, spreading the idea that participative democracy represents the 
indisputable cure for all the problems of the actual society highly contributed to 
consolidating a popular philosophy of indifference and superficiality. 
If the essence of relativism is that “everything is relative, there is no absolute 
truth”, what are the arguments standing for trusting this assumption? If the relativist 
would apply his doctrine starting with his own assumptions, following the 
hypothesis that there is no way to decide which position is correct and which is not, 
the result would be that the relativist axiom does not represent anything else than a 
simple, arbitrary game of words. What is then the use of the researchers’ efforts, 
struggling to formulate judgements, theories, fighting to amend certain rationing, as 
long as any theory is as good (relative) as anybody else’s?
 (3)  
The intellectual absurdity of scientific relativism is expressed through the 
denial tendency of whatever elementary principles of analytic knowledge. This 
is exactly equivalent with the very denial of the natural laws of the human 
society, even of the laws of physics that describe the functioning of the 
universe. For example, postulating the truth of an economic reasoning which is 
lastly deductible to trivial evidence (of the type of “1+1=2” axiom) is met with 
reserves, sometimes on the paradoxical ground that mathematicians did not say 
their final word regarding the validity of the arithmetic operation “1+1=2”
 (4). 
Such a credo undermines the scientific realisations that have been rooted over 
centuries in even the matrix of the human civilisation. 
For example, we put the problem of the capacity of the scientist to answer 
the question “if a healthy apple plus a rotten one always equal two apples”. The Cosmin Marinescu 
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anatomy of the above arithmetic shows a different result. For the scientist 
“1+1” will always equal “2” because the human mind is logically structured on 
the fundamental ground of “unity”. Moreover, the real scientist is the one that 
does not add up one healthy apple with a rotten one, an honest person with a 
criminal, a governed with a governor, an exploited person with an exploiter, etc. 
For scientific knowledge such an arithmetic exercise is not only irrelevant, but 
also a generator of confusion and error. However, for the politician the 
implications of arithmetic are easily quantifiable. For example, by adding up a 
healthy apple with a rotten one, he may declare that… the standard of living has 
increased; by adding up the millions of the millionaire with the zeros of the 
beggar, the politician will say that the “society” is generally ok! 
The postmodernist thinking managed to forget whole centuries of rational 
thinking, periods of systematically employing the logic in the search for truth. The 
Greek idea that something precise can be said only about the things that are time 
independent dominated the philosophical thought until modernity decided to 
embrace Nietzsche’s request for “revaluing all the values”
(5). In the post-modern 
world the humans are not convinced that gaining knowledge is a good thing in 
itself. For Aristotle knowledge offers power; Francis Bacon is the one that 
programmatically postulated that “knowledge is power”. Being in the middle of the 
process of “democratically revaluing all the values”, the contemporary society 
reversed the identity of Bacon into “power is knowledge in the same time”. If the 
pre-industrial society understood the identity towards science, the post-industrial 
society interprets science as power
(6). As Zygmunt Bauman (1992, Chapter VII) 
writes, “Postmodernism… does not aim at substituting one truth with another one, 
one beauty standard with other, one life ideal with other. More than this, it divides 
the truth, the standards and the ideas in parts that have lost their structure and parts 
that will loose their structure. (…) He proclaims himself for a life without truth, 
standards or ideals”. 
The removal of ideals, faiths and criteria manifests in recent times mostly 
in which regards the relation between science and deity. The scientific 
objectivity that protects a lot of utopia has to exclude all that it does not assume. 
Not randomly have scientists and reputed intellectuals from recent history less 
things in common with ethics than with atheism
(7). This tendency appears due 
to the fact that the scientific idea is not to believe in God, and thus the 
perception that God does not exist. Science cannot identify God, because it 
excludes Him from the start and any demonstration cannot find just the things it 
assumed in the beginning hypotheses: “the argument of revelation critics is thus 
circular: in order to prove the falsity of the Bible, they assumed from the very 
beginning that the Bible is fake, that, otherwise stated, the Bible cannot base 
itself on the existence of miracles” (Patapievici, 2002, p. 71). However, despite 
the fact that early Christianity, including the Bible, had an ambivalent attitude, Economic Science and Postmodernism: Ethics Return 
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sometimes even contradicting economic laws, the religious faith is almost 
always put into an ethical-juridical framework that the economist cannot ignore, 
as I will prove in the final part of this study. 
One of the important sources of the scientific relativism, especially in the 
field of social sciences, lays in the fact that history rather than theory is the one 
that managed to attract attention. Each individual, each tribe, each population 
was seen as owner of its own history. Since no absolute standards of good and 
bad existed back then, all histories were appreciated as being equally valuable 
(historical relativism). Through history it was not intended the expression of 
some judgement about the past or forecasting the future, but the revelation of 
multiculturalism, of human tradition diversity. Hans-Hermann Hoppe (1997,   
p. 1) writes that “according to historicism, there is nothing “good” or “bad” 
from an ethical point of view, all ethical judgements being considered 
subjective. Moreover, with the possible exception of logic, mathematics, and 
natural sciences laws, there are no positive universal laws. Economics and 
sociology are just a history, a sequence of past actions and events of which you 
can learn nothing else than the fact that “that’s the way things happened”. 
The new political and cultural universe of modern society leaves no room 
for the traditional conception regarding logic, which is that logic is the same for 
everybody, since the human nature is the same, irrespective of the skin colour, 
sex, nationality, religion, etc. Gradually the multiculturalism doctrine 
transformed the very idea of logic, considering that logic is no longer the same 
for everybody, but a multi-polar logic, derived not from universal criteria, but 
from sexual, cultural, ethnic and circumstantial ones
(8). 
A new faith seems to dominate the academic thought of the last century.  
I am talking about the doctrine that Ludwig von Mises identifies through the 
denomination of polilogism. This appears as the conjugated result of 
historicism and empiricist positivism, philosophies that in fact undermine the  
a priori methodological basis of economic science. For example, historicism 
assumes that the logical structure of human mind and of the thinking process is 
subject to change during the historical evolution, whereas the racial polilogism 
attributes to each race its own logic. In essence, the central thesis of polilogism, 
in its Marxist version, is that there are two types of logic, one for the occidental 
civilization and one for the cultures that are subject to its “exploitation”, or, in 
relativist version, that there is logic for each culture and historical context. 
However, as the economic science and history proved, the Marxist polilogism is 
a failed strategy to save the unsustainable doctrines of socialism, through the 
substitution of logical reasoning with intuition, attractive attempt for those 
inclined to popular superstitions? This is the reason for which Mises (1966,  
p. 85) shows that “the attitude that puts the Marxist polilogism and its product, Cosmin Marinescu 
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“the sociology of knowledge”, in an irreconcilable antagonism vis-à-vis the 
science and the reasoning”. 
For example, the idea that Marxism is a science appears strongly rooted in 
the intellectual environment of many countries, especially in the countries that had 
something to do with the socialist experiment, despite its dramatic failure. The 
great historic Paul Johnson (2002, p. 82) shows that the phenomenon spread also in 
the non-Marxist world, “due to the fact that intellectuals, and especially 
academicians, are fascinated by power, whereas the identification of Marxism with 
a powerful physic authority tempted several professors to accept the Marxist 
“science” in their disciplines, especially in the non-exact or quasi-exact fields such 
as economics, sociology, history and geography”. It is possible that if the war for 
Central and Eastern Europe would have been gained by Hitler rather than Stalin, 
thus ending up with the implementation of his own policies over a great part of the 
world, the Nazi doctrine (which pretended itself to be scientific, according to the 
racial theory it sustained) would have had an academic allure and would have 
entered all the universities in the world. The military victory however ensured the 
imposition of the Marxist “science”
(9). However, what can be “scientific” in Marx’s 
writings or in the Nazi doctrine? The undesired experiment of the “rationally 
planned society” meant in reality the exit of the human society from the human 
framework and its regression back in history, in the animal world of slavery, 
totalitarianism and state exploitation. 
In the middle of these problems has gradually appeared the less desired idea 
that ethical standards represent simple social conventions, fact that would impede 
the possibility of ethically validating a multitude of alternative institutional 
arrangements. However, the contradiction comes from the very fact that this 
approach ignores the exigencies of the simplest test: the uniqueness character and 
the universality of human nature, of natural laws to which the entire human being 
conforms to. In this sense, the universal charter of human rights made history not 
because it referred to “people” and attributed them “rights”, but because it strongly 
and finally assumed that the human rights are written in his very nature and are 
thus universal. The fact that there are relativists sustaining the human rights that do 
not even realize the inconsistency of their position represents the typical confusion 
of post-modern epoch (Patapievici, 2001 p.  401). 
It is irrefutable the fact that the polilogist argument represents nothing else 
than a dissembled attack towards the economic science, a relativist exercise of 
sublimating the “correct knowledge”, especially in the field of economic policies. 
Socialists, racists, nationalists and statists failed in their attempts to reject the 
economists’ theories and to prove the correctness of their mystifying doctrines. 
This very frustration is the one that stimulated them to deny the logical and 
epistemological principles on which the entire human thinking is based, both in 
economic activities and in scientific research
(10). In the end the validity of a priori Economic Science and Postmodernism: Ethics Return 
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fundaments of logic and economic science cannot be proven without making a 
reference to these very fundaments. Rationality is the primary, natural given of the 
human being, the existence as such of human rationality being in itself a non-
rational fact. The only assumption that can be formulated with respect to reasoning 
is that it represents the distinctive feature that separates man from animals and that 
attracts with it everything that is specific to humans. 
Rationality is, in fact, the only method that researchers have at their disposal, 
the same method through which can be argued the inacceptable character of 
scientific relativism and through which can be proven that there are positive 
universal laws of (economic) science and ethical truths on which the human 
civilization is grounded. Obviously I do not want to suggest the fact that rationality 
can ever make a man know everything. Irrespective of how much would 
knowledge increase, there will always be things having the statute of last data, 
which are not destined to any additional clarifications. The only sure thing is that 
rationality and science can foster human progress and are able to prepare a future of 
good and justice. 
The majority of scientists share the faith that an objective theory of justice is 
impossible based on universal ethical principles. Obsessed by the efficiency 
criterion and by the maximising paradigm, the neoclassic scientism from economic 
theory asserts that not only the means and methods used by each individuals are 
subjective, but anything else too. Under these assumptions, the science, the correct 
knowledge stops being a science at all and in the absence of objective criteria any 
intellectual approach is subject to relativity. However, this means the disappearance 
of borders between justice and injustice, between truth and falsity – the most secure 
means for dissolving the basis of the human civilization. Anyhow the economic 
science teaches us that not the ethics principles are those that are subjective, but 
utilities and costs are subjective economic categories. 
Irrespective of the mutations that appear at the level of the technologies in 
economic life and irrespective of how “old” or “new” is the actual economics, the 
ethical character of human action and the framework in which it manifests remain 
indispensable. Economic life is a huge network of exchanges which at their 
fundamental level do not represent exchanges of goods as such, but exchanges of 
property rights over the goods under question. This proves that any theory of the 
exchange (of the market) has to be consolidated, as preliminary fact, by the 
(legitimate) theory of property rights, and thus the need to know the content of law 
and to argue the justice and legitimacy of these laws. “The right to property” or 
“property rights”? – this is the great challenge of political philosophy and of 
economics. This is the reason for which the fundamental question to which the 
science has to find an answer is: how can the society be designed such that 
institutional order to be ethic and just, and to what extent does this institutional 
arrangement support the creation of wealth and material welfare? Cosmin Marinescu 
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I do consider that the economic science has to be sensitive to the nature of 
individual objectives and to the means employed for their accomplishment.   
I hereby formulate a plea for the ethical dimension of economics. The economic 
science is an ethical science, mostly on the basis of compulsory distinctions that 
appear at the level of purposes that individuals have to follow and implicitly of the 
means that he is legitimately empowered to use in his actions
(11). Since economics 
operates in the institutional framework of inter-human relations, then the ethical 
dimension of these relations is an indispensable one. Economic theory and history 
show us that the creation of wealth naturally implies an ethical character through 
the very peaceful nature of the means employed, social cooperation through 
production and voluntary exchange of legitimate property rights, not through 
aggression, violence and expropriation, which are lacked of legitimacy. 
Defining the sphere of correct (incorrect) actions constitutes the natural 
results of creating and enforcing the institution of rights that has in this way 
become the biggest invention of humans in their entire history, through the very 
fact that this institution made possible the formation and the existence of 
society. Only in this manner it becomes possible to define the infringements of 
rights, under the form of interferences in the control that an individual 
legitimately exercises over his properties.  
Human reasoning has the capacity to discover the (natural) law, starting with 
the profound tendencies of human nature that are absolute, immutable and 
universally valid in all time and place. This means that the natural law offers an 
objective ensemble of ethical norms for evaluating the legitimacy of human actions 
at any time and under any circumstances (Rothbard, 1991). In this manner the 
rational natural right becomes the necessary guide for the nascence of the positive 
system of law and/or for reforming the existing legal arrangements, due to the fact 
that the theorists of natural right derive from the very human nature and from the 
natural laws, a law system independent of epoch and place, but also independent of 
customs, traditions and collective values. 
After Max Weber the dominant position in social sciences, at least de 
jure, was the one of Wertfreiheit, the idea that science does not have to 
incorporate value judgements but positive (objective) statements, due to the fact 
that the end goals wouldn’t be anything else but personal preferences that are 
susceptible of a rational justification. The fact that J.M. Keynes affirmed that 
economic science is a moral science did not impeached him to contribute, 
through his political implications of his work, at the destroying of the ethical 
character of economic science. Unfortunately, the conception of classical 
philosophy according to which a system of rational norms and scientific moral 
values is possible has been completely abandoned. 
Today, the result is the conservation of o positive pseudo-economy, based 
not on the value judgements of the scientist, but on a supposed consensus over Economic Science and Postmodernism: Ethics Return 
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others’ values. The idea that the value judgements that are necessary to the 
scientific approach are those of the “population” literally suffocates the social 
sciences. Thus, the scientific objectivity would not comprise the search for truth 
– whatever it may be – but the matching of conclusions with others’ 
subjectivity, whatever little advised would they be. However, it has to be 
understood that value judgements do not become right or legitimate through the 
fact that a great number of persons adopt those convictions. Very often the 
scientist is associated with a “professional” asked to offer to his clients – to the 
public – the most adequate recipes for attaining their goals (whatever they may 
be?). In reality the problem is correctly stated once it is accepted the 
impossibility of avoiding to choose between good and bad. The scientist, whose 
ultimate purpose is the correct knowledge, cannot ignore the ethical dimension 
of the teachings that his research promotes.  
Ethics is the rule of legitimate property rights, the rule of justice, of freedom 
in society. Only ethical principles can provide objective criteria for consolidating 
life in society, by solving the potential conflicts. This implies the sanctioning of 
those that aim at the attainment of other purposes than the legitimate ones. Life in 
society implies something more than the demand expressed by neoclassical 
economists: the best manner of satisfying the needs, which for some would mean 
steal, fraud, violence and exploitation. Not any purpose can be accepted and not 
any means that lead to this purpose can be allowed. 
Under these assumptions the only fundamental criterion that may save the 
scientific nature of the economy is that provided by ethics
(12). The economic 
judgements become complete when they are complemented with ethics, since 
economics, laws and ethics are naturally correlated and represent the means for 
the correct understanding of the human society. 
Almost all problems formulated in this article explain and reflect the 
epistemological and methodological crisis that characterise the actual evolution of 
science, with the consequence of its depersonalisation. If the things really converge 
in this manner than it seems that the practical solution can be only one like the 
teachings of Poincaré: “there is nothing more practical than a good theory” in the 
sense of generalizing the validity of this teaching and, in the same time, of correct 
theories. I do consider that the interest to make up a good, correct theory, whatever 
the conclusions and the implications of it may be, has to represent the milestone of 
whatever scientific approach and also the honesty proof of each scientist. 
Acknowledgements 
This paper is suported by the Sectorial Operational Programme Human 
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund 
and by the Romanian Government under the contract number SOP 
HRD/89/1.5/S/62988. Cosmin Marinescu 
 
132 
 
Notes 
 
(1)  Almost all that is written actually in the field of economics is presented both to the academic 
world and to the public debate under the wrapping of “scientific product”. Irrespective of 
how logic or contradictory is the rationing in these writings, they are nonchalantly put under 
the scientific umbrella. As a result, it seems that everything one thinks about his/her object 
of research is scientific. Very often completely opposing theories, theories that offer 
contradictory explanations for the same economic phenomenon, are tolerated as being 
“scientific” despite the fact that it is easily understood that not all writings are correlated 
with the correct knowledge of science. Clearly this gradually leads to the decrease in the 
value of science, being it utopian or lacked of logic. For example, the term “scientific” was 
often used by Marx in order to distinguish himself from his ideological adversaries. “He and 
his work were “scientific”; the others weren’t” (Johnson, 2002, p. 81). 
(2) For example, once an empiric-positivist theory is adopted we find ourselves in the 
impossibility of formulating some principle arguments against some unfortunate events that 
flagellated the human civilization, such as war, socialism, holocaust… 
(3)  There exists the faith that the major purpose of the scientist is not to educate (that is to offer 
logical frames for the principles that save the human society from chaos, poverty and moral 
disorder) but to “open the minds of the young”. The problem lies in the fact that the mind of 
people can be opened up using different means, not all of them being equally desirable for 
the peaceful life of the individual in society. My plea is that we don’t have to be indifferent 
to the means in which the professors “open up the mind” of our children, if their “lessons” 
instigate to violence, racism, political exploitation, war, or if they are aimed at protecting the 
life and the fundamental ideals of people. 
(4)  For the extreme relativist the result of a mathematical operation is arbitrary, “1+1” could 
equal “3”, “100”, “1176” and (why not?) an infinite. Do we make a mistake when we teach 
our children in schools that “1+1=2” or that, according to elementary logic, “you cannot eat 
this pie and keep it for later in the same time”? If the relativist says that “1+1” may equal 
“5”, would he be willing to give up a banknote of 500 EUR in exchange for 2 banknotes of 
100 EUR in order to protect his own credo? Even in the situation in which he would accept 
this monetary sacrifice, wouldn’t he just diminish the means employed for his own 
purposes, thus contrary to his credo? 
(5) The classical Greek thought culminating in the works of Aristotle gave the Westerners a 
profound rationalist attitude: the perception of humans as rational animals, the highest respect for 
logic and logical thought, a strong faith in the existence of the natural law and of the 
cognoscibility of human and nature, a strong realism and the “human spirit” (Hoppe, 1997). 
(6)  Thus, postmodernism has its roots in the complete politization of the social life, as H.R. 
Patapievici (2001, p. 133) shows: “the essence of the postmodern agenda (…) is 
fundamentally politic. However, the political scope of the postmodern assertion is to remove 
any reference to universal and to bring the human sciences in the situation in which in the 
future any reference to universality, coming from a serious researcher, would seem to the 
great public and to the intellectual community as dual, dangerous and fundamentalist as a 
return to God’s church today, in the democratic politics. 
(7)  See Paul Johnson, 2002. 
(8)  For example the Marxist theory suggests that the human’s thinking is determined by his 
class affiliation. Each social class would have inherited its own logic. The products of Economic Science and Postmodernism: Ethics Return 
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thought can thus be nothing else but an “ideological mask” of egoistic class interests of the 
thinker. In the Marxist opinion, the Ricardian theory of comparative costs has no 
fundaments due to the fact that Ricardo was a bourgeois. German racists condemn the same 
theory due to the fact that Ricardo was a Jew, whereas German nationalists do the same on 
the ground that he was British. 
(9)  The arrival of nihilism for Nietzsche and the distributive logic of capitalism for Marx seem 
to have the same signification, such that “if the philosophic prophet of postmodernism was 
Nietzsche, its economic prophet has indubitably been Marx” (Patapievici, 2001, p. 146) 
(10) The real scientist is not allowed to reject the “relativist objections” (a flagrant contradiction 
in fact) only through invoking the partisan prejudices that inspired them. In order to discover 
the errors, the scientist has no other arsenal than logic, the only mental instrument that can 
stay at the basis of “correct knowledge”. Ludwig von Mises (1966:91) shows that “to 
remove a theory through invoking its historical origins, the “spirit” of the times in which it 
was formulated, the material conditions from its country of whatever personal particularities 
of its authors is a helpless strategy. A theory is not subjected but to the tribute of reasoning. 
The adequate criterion for analysing it is always the reasoning criterion. A theory is either 
correct either incorrect. It is possible that in the actual state of our knowledge not to have the 
possibility to decide regarding its fairness or lack of fairness. However a theory can never be 
valid for both a bourgeois and an American and invalid for a proletarian and a Chinese. 
(11) Not any preference can be accepted and not any type of action that would have as a result its 
satisfying is allowed; this is the reason for adding the attribute “legitimate” next to “means” 
and “goals”. The initiation of interpersonal relations (or equivalently the formation of 
society) implies something more than the demand of satisfying the best all the needs, 
expressed by all economists after Menger, Walras and Jevons. 
(12) See Murray Rothbard (1991), www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ethics.asp. Rothbard is the 
first “Austrian” that systematically recommends the utilitarian position dominant in the 
economic science, position represented by Mises himself in the tradition of the Austrian 
school of economics. The Misesian plea for the free market was argued for in a utilitarian 
manner, somehow empiric, through its superior efficiency. In reality the debate over the free 
market system has to be mainly based on ethical arguments and not necessarily (maybe just 
complementary) on economic efficiency ones. 
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